| 结合风险选择和努力水平的创业投资家报酬模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 劳剑东,胡文伟,李湛.结合风险选择和努力水平的创业投资家报酬模型[J].上海交通大学学报,2007,41(7):1138-1141. |
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| 作者姓名： | 劳剑东 胡文伟 李湛 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052
2. 香港大福证券集团研究部,香港 |
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| 摘 要： | 应用委托代理理论,在标准的道德风险模型中增加风险变量和有限责任约束,分析了创业投资家的报酬合约特征.结果表明,即使参与人均为风险中性,一级最优的报酬合约也类似于看涨期权合约,这与创业投资的实践相符.
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| 关 键 词： | 创业投资基金 报酬合约 道德风险 一级最优 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-2467（2007）07-1138-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-07-27 |
An Incentive Model of Venture Capitalist's Compensation Incorporating Choices of Risk and Effort |
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| LAO Jian-dong,HU Wen-wei,LI Zhan.An Incentive Model of Venture Capitalist''''s Compensation Incorporating Choices of Risk and Effort[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2007,41(7):1138-1141. |
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| Authors: | LAO Jian-dong HU Wen-wei LI Zhan |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzed the option like feature of venture capitalist's compensation contract applying principal-agent theory.The result shows,if adding risk variable and limited liability constraint to the standard moral hazard model,even the participants are risk neutral,the first best compensation contract resemble an option contract.The result fits well with the venture capital practice. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital fund compensation contract moral hazard first best |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
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