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组织中员工知识分享行为激励机制的比较分析
引用本文:柯江林,石金涛.组织中员工知识分享行为激励机制的比较分析[J].上海交通大学学报,2006,40(9):1566-1571.
作者姓名:柯江林  石金涛
作者单位:上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052
摘    要:如何促进员工进行知识分享是提升组织竞争优势的关键问题.但由于知识拥有者担心专家地位受到威胁以及需要承担机会成本与风险等,知识分享难以自发进行.探讨几种可能解决知识分享问题的机制后,发现在完全信息静态环境下知识双向转移会陷入囚徒困境,对知识分享行为采用直接的、显性激励机制会产生激励扭曲问题,而实行关联报酬则可以产生较好效果,但在互惠信任机制下达到最佳.

关 键 词:知识分享  囚徒困境  激励扭曲  互惠信任
文章编号:1006-2467(2006)09-1566-06
收稿时间:2005-09-11
修稿时间:2005年9月11日

A Comparative Analysis on the Mechanisms to Motivate the Knowledge Sharing Behavior of Employees in Organization
KE Jiang-lin,SHI Jin-tao.A Comparative Analysis on the Mechanisms to Motivate the Knowledge Sharing Behavior of Employees in Organization[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2006,40(9):1566-1571.
Authors:KE Jiang-lin  SHI Jin-tao
Abstract:How to promote the knowledge sharing behavior of employees is the key problem to strengthen the competitive advantage for organization.Because the knowledge owner is afraid to be weakened on the professional power and need to burden the opportunity cost and knowledge sharing risk,the knowledge sharing can not occur spontaneously.After comparing several mechanisms which maybe resolve the problem of knowledge sharing,it is found two-way knowledge transfer will be trouble in prisoner's dilemma under the complete information and static state,and the incentive distortion will be found if adopting the directly explicit incentive mechanism,contrarily,it can be more effective if using the joint paying,and(even) reach the optimization if the trust of reciprocity exits.
Keywords:knowledge sharing  prisoner's dilemma  incentive distortion  trust of reciprocity  
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