| 经理股票期权应用效率分析模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 柯江林,冯力文,石金涛.经理股票期权应用效率分析模型[J].上海交通大学学报,2004,38(3):340-343. |
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| 作者姓名： | 柯江林 冯力文 石金涛 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200052
2. 中国建设银行,重庆分行,重庆,400010 |
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| 摘 要： | 经理股票期权(ESO)在西方是一种重要的长期激励工具，目前国内也对其十分重视．尽管ESO在减少股东对经理的监督成本以及经理行为长期化方面发挥着重要作用，但它并非对代理人总是有很好的激励状态，其效率随诸多因素变动．本文借助一个不对称信息契约模型，反映了经理股票期权的应用效率．
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| 关 键 词： | 经理股票期权 不对称信息 契约模型 效率 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-2467(2004)03-0340-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002年9月17日 |
A Model to Analyze the Efficiency of Executive Stock Options in Application |
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| KE Jiang-lin,FENG Li-wen,SHI Jin-tao.A Model to Analyze the Efficiency of Executive Stock Options in Application[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2004,38(3):340-343. |
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| Authors: | KE Jiang-lin FENG Li-wen SHI Jin-tao |
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| Institution: | KE Jiang-lin~1,FENG Li-wen~2,SHI Jin-tao~1 |
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| Abstract: | Executive stock options (ESO) is one of the most important long-term incentive tools. ESO plays very crucial roles in decreasing the cost to monitor executive for shareholders and guiding executive's behavior towards company's long-term benefits. However, it is not always appropriate to motivate executives because there are many factors to affect its efficiency. By an asymmetry information contract model, the ESO's efficiency in application was analyzed. |
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| Keywords: | executive stock option asymmetry information contract model efficiency |
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