对企业实行外部监控的调查与监督

企业的监督与激励是现代企业制度的两个方面，主要讨论了如何实现对企业的有效监督．从最大化社会福利的角度出发，讨论了对企业实行监督的机制，应用博奕论的思想分析了监督者与被监督者的博奕过程，并以调查、监视、举报和罚款等措施来防范企业的违法经营．在存在信息不对称的条件下讨论了这些措施之间的关系，得出了罚款与调查和监视之间存在替代性．为实现最优的社会福利，监督者对企业采取随机的监视和调查并给出这种监视和调查的最优频率形式的特点．

Monitoring and Investigation in Firm External Supervision

Supervising and incentive are two aspects of modern firm mechanism. A supervising mechanism is discussed by optimizing social welfare. As monitor and offense are a game process according to game theory, monitoring, investigation, victim's report and levy fine can be used to avoid offense. Some results about their relation are given. The optimal probability of random monitoring and investigation is shown in the paper.