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承运人联盟合作博弈机制设计
引用本文:王文杰,陈峰,江志斌.承运人联盟合作博弈机制设计[J].上海交通大学学报,2011,45(12):1778-1781.
作者姓名:王文杰  陈峰  江志斌
作者单位:(上海交通大学 a. 中美物流研究院;b. 工业工程与物流工程系, 上海 200240)
基金项目:国家自然科学基金重大国际(地区)合作研究项目(70831160527);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771063)
摘    要:承运人联盟中,各成员追求各自收益最大化,成员与联盟的最优决策往往是不一致的,因而导致联盟不稳定.承运人面对产生的需求有2种选择:接受或拒绝.考虑该约束条件,在一个由承运人联盟运营的航运物流网络的基础上,以合作博弈理论和数学规划为框架建立了承运人联盟的合作博弈模型,并设计了运力互租价格为核心的收益分摊机制,该机制为联盟成员提供了补偿性支付.分别对联盟和成员的决策过程进行数学建模,运用逆优化技术使得两者的最优决策一致,进而实现了联盟和合作的可持续性.

关 键 词:合作博弈    承运人联盟    机制设计    逆优化  
收稿时间:2010-12-03

Cooperative Game Based Mechanisms Design in Carrier Alliance
WANG Wen-jiea,CHEN Fenga,b,JIANG Zhi-bina,b.Cooperative Game Based Mechanisms Design in Carrier Alliance[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2011,45(12):1778-1781.
Authors:WANG Wen-jiea  CHEN Fenga  b  JIANG Zhi-bina  b
Institution:(a. Shanghai Sino US Global Institute; b. Department of Industrial Engineering and Logistics Engineering, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200240, China)
Abstract:After carriers forming an alliance,because each carrier operates according to its own profits,the benefit of each member is usually not in line with the whole alliance's,which leads to the instability of alliance.Carriers have two choices when facing emerging customer needs: refuse or accept.Combined the constraints,and based on the establishment of shipping logistics network operated by a carrier alliance,cooperative game theory and mathematical programming method are utilized to establish the cooperative ...
Keywords:cooperative game  carrier alliance  mechanism design  inverse optimization  
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