基于质量罚金的供应链成员质量改进决策

建立了一个质量改进决策博弈模型，分析售后质量损失费用的承担比例对供应商、购买商的质量改进决策的影响.结果表明：购买商通过提高供应商对于售后质量损失费用的承担比例并不一定能促使供应商进行质量改进投入；购买商不应该将质量改进的责任完全推给供应商；在选择供应商时，购买商除了关注供应商对于售后质量损失分担比例的承诺外，供应商的初始质量情况及质量改进决策也很重要.

The Decision-Making on Quality Improvement of Supply-Chain Members Based on Quality Penalty

The quality penalty is usually taken as a measure to stimulate the supplier to improve quality.In practice the quality improvement usually involves the supplier and the purchaser.In order to find the effect of after-sale quality loss on the decision-making on quality improvement,a game model of decision-making on quality improvement was proposed.It is found that the purchaser can not necessarily stimulate the investment of the supplier into the quality improvement by increasing the proportion of the aftersale quality loss to be borne by the supplier,and that the purchaser shall not make the supplier solely liable for the quality improvement.In choosing a supplier,the purchaser shall not only focus on the commitment of the supplier to assume certain proportion of the after-sale loss,but pay due attention to the preliminary quality status and the decision-making on quality improvement of the supplier.