网络效应下的企业横向兼并与价格竞争

基于Salop圆形城市模型，研究了网络效应环境下企业横向兼并的动机及其社会福利，讨论了兼并对企业价格竞争行为的影响。结果表明，网络效应环境下，企业普遍具有兼并 动机，未兼并在企业竞争中始终处于相当不利的地位，当网络效应很强时，未兼并企业将被逐出市场，兼并企业成为市场的垄断厂商，通过对企业兼并前后社会福利的分析发现，当网络效应较强时，即使未兼并厂商被逐出市场，市场形成垄断，社会福利仍会改善。因此，政府应放宽对存在网络效应的行业中企业兼并的管制。

Horizontal Merger and Price Competition Based on Network Effect

Based on the Salop circular city model, the motive and social welfare of enterprise's horizontal merger were analyzed, and the influence of merger on the price competition behavior was discussed. The results show that, under the network effect circumstance, most enterprises have the motive to merge in order to attract more consumers. The merger is unfavorable to the enterprise not engaged in merger. When the network effect is strong, the enterprise not engaged in merger should be excluded from the market, and the merging enterprise should be monopolist. As to the impact of merger to social welfare, the study shows, when the network effect is strong, although the enterprise not engaged in merger is excluded from the market and the market is monopolized by the merging enterprise, the social welfare is still improved. So the government should relax the regulation of the merger in the industry with network effect.