有限理性视角下突发事件社会舆论传播阶段的演化博弈分析与控制

社会公众对待突发事件的有限理性使得舆论传播具有较大的不确定性. 为保持社会稳定发展, 突发事件的社会舆论控制是政府部门关注与研究的重点. 基于局中人有限理性视角, 通过构造处罚博弈和激励博弈模型, 比较分析了政府对舆论传播行为实施处罚及对事件发展给予正面宣传的不同策略, 以演化博弈法推演了社会公众群体在突发事件舆论传播中的行为演化方向. 结果表明, 政府部门在舆论传播初期阶段加大处罚力度或加大正面激励力度将更有效地增加社会公众传播舆论的成本, 或增大社会公众不传播舆论的心理收益, 从而达到控制舆情传播的效果. 通过结合“昆山反杀案”及山东“辱母杀人案”等实例, 分析比较了社会公众的初始状态及演变方向, 验证了在突发事件舆论传播的初期阶段实施阶段控制策略的有效性. 研究结论也说明, 将问题解决于萌芽阶段, “防微杜渐”、“未雨绸缪”等是实践中对突发事件舆论传播进行阶段控制的重要方法.

Evolutionary game analysis and control of public opinions during emergencies under different stages of communication and limited rationality

Public opinion during emergencies has a great deal of impact on social stability and development. Hence, the government focuses on methods of controlling public opinion, using methods that can solve a problem in its infancy. This paper used the evolutionary game method and introduced the punishment game model, wherein the government punished public opinion, and the incentive game model, wherein the government provided positive news on emergencies so as to deduce the evolutionary direction of the behavior of public groups. The results showed that during the early stages of public opinion communication, increasing punishment or positive publicity by government departments would increase the punishment cost of public opinion communication, or increase the psychological benefits of public opinion non-communication, so as to further achieve the goal of controlling public opinion. This paper analyzed the characteristics of different development stages of emergencies by analyzing the “Kunshan anti-killing” and Shandong “insulting mother and killing” cases. It put forward suggestions for decision-making for the government to control public opinion during emergencies.