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供应链企业间合作广告的博弈分析
引用本文:林英晖,屠梅曾.供应链企业间合作广告的博弈分析[J].上海大学学报(自然科学版),2005,11(4):436-440.
作者姓名:林英晖  屠梅曾
作者单位:1. 上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200052;上海大学,国际工商与管理学院,上海,201800
2. 上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200052
摘    要:合作广告对扩大产品的有效需求具有十分重要的意义.该文建立了制造商与零售商之间合作广告的Stackelberg博弈模型,分别探讨了单阶段与多阶段两种情况下的博弈均衡,得出了两个结论:一是制造商品牌投入的增加或承担合作广告成本比例的提高都将导致零售商合作性广告努力水平的提高;二是多阶段博弈比单阶段博弈能够得到更好的合作效果.

关 键 词:合作广告  制造商  零售商  博弈分析
文章编号:1007-2861(2005)04-0436-05
收稿时间:2004-06-28
修稿时间:2004年6月28日

Game Analysis on Cooperative Advertising between Firms within a Supply Chain
LIN Ying-hui,Tu Mei-zeng.Game Analysis on Cooperative Advertising between Firms within a Supply Chain[J].Journal of Shanghai University(Natural Science),2005,11(4):436-440.
Authors:LIN Ying-hui  Tu Mei-zeng
Abstract:Cooperative advertising has important significance in expanding product demands. This paper sets up a Stackelberg game model for cooperative advertising between the manufacturer and the retailer in a supply chain. The two-stage and higher order Stackelberg equilibrium are discussed respectively with two significant conclusions. First, increased investment in brand advertising or a greater share taken by the manufacturer in the cooperative advertising expenditure will lead to the increased investment in cooperative advertising by the retailer. Secondly, the higher order Stackelberg game provides more effective equilibrium than that of two-stage game.
Keywords:cooperative advertising  manufacturer  retailer  game analysis  
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