技术创新投资中企业与政府之间的博弈分析 |
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引用本文: | 赵惠芳,李传军.技术创新投资中企业与政府之间的博弈分析[J].合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版),2003,26(5):959-962. |
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作者姓名: | 赵惠芳 李传军 |
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作者单位: | 合肥工业大学,管理学院,安徽,合肥,230009 |
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基金项目: | 国家社会科学基金资助项目(00BJY050) |
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摘 要: | 技术创新是经济发展的动力和源泉,企业是技术创新的主体,但政府也应通过创新政策的介入来鼓励和促进企业的创新。由于企业和政府各自效用不同,从而对技术创新的投入战略不同,双方对技术创新投资时都本着自己效用最大化的原则,使其在投资决策中二者相互博弈,文章通过一个静态博弈模型分析并试解释某些现实经济现象。
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关 键 词: | 技术创新投资 博弈分析 纳什均衡 |
文章编号: | 1003-5060(2003)05-0959-04 |
修稿时间: | 2003年2月24日 |
Investment in technological innovation:An analysis of game between the government and enterprises |
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Abstract: | Technological innovation has been regarded as the motive power and source of economic development,and the enterprises are considered to be the main body in the process of technological innovation,but the government should encourage and promote the innovation of enterprises by implementing innovation policies. The enterprise's strategy in technological innovation input is different from the government's because the government and enterprises are different in their utility. Both the government and the enterprises invest in the technological innovation based on their maximized utility,so they game with each other in the process of making investment strategy. In this paper,a model of static game is presented and analyzed,and some actual economic phenomena are discussed. |
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Keywords: | technoloigcal innovation investment analysis of game Nash equilibrium |
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