分销合同下考虑附加定价的供应链优化问题

针对分销合同下附加产品的附加销售或与核心产品的捆绑销售问题,运用消费者效用理论建立需求函数。利用主从对策原理求得不同情形下的均衡解,比较分析出消费者效用最大化时满足供应链成员共赢的条件。结果发现:当线上产品的接受程度低、但核心产品的感知价值较高时,批发价合同下采用“附加+捆绑”定价可以使得公司和线上平台达到共赢;当收益共享因子足够低、但核心产品的感知价值较高,或者收益共享因子较低时,代发货合同下采用“附加+捆绑”定价可以使得公司和线上平台达到共赢。最后,在比较合同时发现,收益共享因子较低时,公司在批发价合同下获利更多,而线上平台在代发货合同下获利更多。

Supply chain optimization considering add-on pricing under distribution contract

Aiming at the problem of additional sales of additional products or bundled sales with core products under distribution contract, the demand function is established by using the theory of consumer utility. Using the principle of master-slave strategy, the equilibrium solutions under different situations are obtained, and the win-win conditions of supply chain members are compared and analyzed when the consumer utility maximizes. The results show that: when the acceptance degree of online products is low, but the perceived value of core products is high, the company and online platform can achieve win-win situation by adopting “additional+bundling” pricing under wholesale price contract; when the revenue sharing factor is low enough, but the perceived value of the core product is high, or the revenue sharing factor is low, the company and the online platform can achieve a win-win situation by adopting “additional+bundling” pricing under the consignment contract. Finally, when comparing contracts, we find that when the revenue sharing factor is low, the company gains more under the wholesale price contract, while the online platform gains more under the consignment contract.