| 基于多任务委托-代理模型的IT外包激励机制分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 周波,张嵩.基于多任务委托-代理模型的IT外包激励机制分析[J].青岛大学学报(自然科学版),2011,24(1):84-88. |
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| 作者姓名： | 周波 张嵩 |
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| 作者单位： | 青岛大学管理科学与工程系,山东,青岛,266071 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，山东省自然科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于委托-代理理论，运用霍姆斯特姆和米尔格罗姆多任务委托-代理模型的分析框架，选取信息技术外包项目绩效中的技术效应和经济效益两项任务，建立多任务委托-代理模型，在两项任务相互独立和相互依存两种情况下，对信息技术外包激励问题进行分析。研究表明：两项任务相互独立情况下，企业对风险规避度低的接包方提高对其各项任务的激励强度；比较两项任务，当两者可观测变量方差相同时，对边际成本变化率低的任务提高其激励强度，当两者边际成本变化率相同时，对可观测变量方差小的任务提高其激励强度。两项任务相互依存情况下，发包方经济效益的激励强度在两项任务互补时应增强，在替代时应减弱。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息技术外包 激励机制 多任务委托-代理 道德风险 |
Incentive Mechanism Model Based on Multi-task Principal-agent for IT Outsourcing |
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| ZHOU Bo,ZHANG Song.Incentive Mechanism Model Based on Multi-task Principal-agent for IT Outsourcing[J].Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition),2011,24(1):84-88. |
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| Authors: | ZHOU Bo ZHANG Song |
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| Institution: | ZHOU Bo,ZHANG Song(Department of Management Science and Engineering,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the principal-agent theory,using the multi-task principal-agent model of Holmstrom &Milgrom as an analysis framework,two tasks of the technical effects and the economic benefits of the IT outsourcing project performance were selected to build a multi-task principal-agent model.The issues of IT outsourcing incentive were discussed under two conditions of independent tasks and inter-dependent tasks.Research results show that under the condition of independent tasks,the corporation should enhance the ... |
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| Keywords: | IT outsourcing incentive mechanism multi-task principal-agent moral hazard |
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