双重信息不对称下有效的经济竞赛机制

研究了双重信息不对称下,即悖逆选择与败德行为并存下,有效经济竞赛机制之设计问题.刻划了有效的经济竞赛机制之特征,并证明了在双重信息不对称下,当监督精度外生给定时,分离均衡难以达到.而通过对监督精度的适当调节,委托人可以设计一种既能引致自我选择又满足激励相容条件有效的经济竞赛机制.

Efficient Economic Contest under Dual Information Asymmetry

The problem of designing an efficient economic contest under dual information asymmetry,I. E. Under which agency problems of adverse selection and moral hazard may co-exist is explored. First,what an efficient contract of economic contest should be under dual information asymmetry is characterized. Second,it is proved that self-selective condition and incentive compatible condition can't be met simultaneously. Finally,how to achieve efficient outcome by the proper adjustment of monitoring precision is examined.