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虚拟企业收益共享合同中的监控机制研究
引用本文:陈剑,陈剑锋.虚拟企业收益共享合同中的监控机制研究[J].复旦学报(自然科学版),2007,46(4):489-496.
作者姓名:陈剑  陈剑锋
作者单位:清华大学,经济管理学院,北京,100084
摘    要:虚拟企业作为一种新兴的企业管理模式,因其能在短时间内集合各种企业外部资源来追逐一个稍纵即逝的市场机会等优点,受到越来越多的管理者的重视.然而,虚拟企业各成员间合作都是利益驱动的,因此如何防止虚拟企业成员的机会主义行为损坏虚拟企业的利益,协调好各成员之间的关系是虚拟企业成功运行需要解决的首要问题.期望联合监控机制和收益共享合同来激励各伙伴企业付出更多努力,从而增加虚拟企业收益并减少搭便车行为.并通过建立模型比较4种不同监控机制对于伙伴企业个体行为及虚拟企业整体利益的影响.

关 键 词:虚拟企业  收益共享  监控机制  激励  关系风险
文章编号:0427-7104(2007)04-0489-08
修稿时间:2007年6月21日

Monitoring in Revenue Sharing Contract of Virtual Enterprises
CHEN Jian,CHEN Jian-feng.Monitoring in Revenue Sharing Contract of Virtual Enterprises[J].Journal of Fudan University(Natural Science),2007,46(4):489-496.
Authors:CHEN Jian  CHEN Jian-feng
Abstract:As a new kind of enterprise management model,virtual enterprises(VEs) are getting to be a practical choice of more and more enterprises since it could catch the transient market opportunities by integrating the outside resources in a short time.However,virtual enterprises are profit-driven,thereby the first thing that VE should solve is how to prevent the VE profit from being harmed by free-riding behavior and how to coordinate the relationship between members.In order to increase the VE output,monitoring mechanism are combined with revenue sharing contract to combat the free-riding behavior and motivate the member enterprises to contribute more productive efforts.A model of monitoring in revenue sharing contract of VEs is constructed and the effect of four different monitoring technologies on the members' actions and VE profit is also discussed.
Keywords:virtual enterprise  revenue sharing  monitoring mechanism  incentive  relational risk
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