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双寡头纵向产品差异化市场的演化博弈分析
引用本文:石岿然,肖条军.双寡头纵向产品差异化市场的演化博弈分析[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2004,34(4):523-528.
作者姓名:石岿然  肖条军
作者单位:1. 南京大学工程管理学院,南京,210093;南京工业大学理学院,南京,210009
2. 南京大学工程管理学院,南京,210093
摘    要:基于一个具有非线性需求函数的纵向产品差异化模型,研究双寡头市场的演化稳定策略.考虑市场分别存在生产高质量产品和低质量产品的2家企业进行的两阶段博弈问题,企业在第1阶段选择策略变量(价格或产量),在第2阶段确定价格的高低或产量的大小. 通过博弈分析,证明了Cournot均衡为子博弈精炼纳什均衡.在此基础上建立了复制者动态系统,运用演化博弈方法讨论系统各平衡点的局部稳定性,得到了产量策略构成惟一演化稳定策略的结论.

关 键 词:双寡头市场  纵向产品差异化  演化博弈论  演化稳定策略
文章编号:1001-0505(2004)04-0523-06

Evolutionary game analysis of duopolistic market with vertical production differentiation
Shi Kuiran , Xiao Tiaojun.Evolutionary game analysis of duopolistic market with vertical production differentiation[J].Journal of Southeast University(Natural Science Edition),2004,34(4):523-528.
Authors:Shi Kuiran  Xiao Tiaojun
Institution:Shi Kuiran 1,2 Xiao Tiaojun 1
Abstract:Based on a vertical product differentiation model with nonlinear demand function s, the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in a duopolistic market in which a hig h quality firm and a low quality firm are involved is studied. In the first stag e of a two stage game, the firms choose their strategic variable, price or quan tity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. The result that the Cournot equilibrium constitutes a sub game perfec t Nash equilibrium is obtained by game analysis. Also, the replicator dynamic system is built and the local stability of the fixed points is discussed from the perspective of the evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, the theorem that the quantity strategy is the unique ESS is proved.
Keywords:duopolistic market  vertical product di fferentiation  evolutionary game theory  evolutionary stable strategy
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