闭环供应链的收入共享契约

研究了闭环供应链的收入共享契约问题,销售商决定销售价格、回收努力水平,制造商决定产品批发价格和回购价格.构建了以制造商为主、零售商为从的Stackelberg模型框架,分析了分散决策同集中决策之间的关系,探讨了系统参数对供应链及其成员利润的影响;引入收入共享契约,使得分散决策下供应链利润达到集中决策水平,并得出了实现供应链协调的基本条件以及实现供应链成员企业之间关于增加利润的任意分配.研究表明,供应链及其成员绩效受3个系统参数,即销售价格、回收努力水平和收入分享比例的影响,从而为闭环供应链的契约双方签订最优契约提供决策依据.

Revenue sharing contracts for closed-loop supply chains

The coordination of revenue-sharing contract for closed-loop supply chain is studied.The supplier decides on prices of wholesale and take-back,and the retailer decides on retail price and the take-back effort.A Stackelberg game model is constructed where the supplier is a leader and the retailer is a follower.The relationship between decisions of decentralized and centralized supply chain are analyzed and the impacts of system parameters on the supply chain and its members' performance are discussed.Revenue-sharing contract are introduced and further the primary conditions and profit allocation mechanism are established.The random profit allocation of the difference between the centralization and decentralization is accomplished by negotiation.The results show that both the supply chain and its members' performances are affected by three system parameters,retail price,take-back price and retailer's revenue share,offering a decision-making support for the contract members to sign an optimal contract.