公共选择理论视域下的官员选拔制度研究

公共选择理论是20世纪50年代由公共选择学派形成和发展起来的西方经济学理论之一。作为经济学和政治学交叉融合而产生的一种理论,公共选择的研究对象和政治科学的研究对象很多是相同的,其方法论构成与经济学方法论基本是一致的,即:个体主义的方法论、理性人假设和把政治过程视为一个交换过程。干部选拔任用制度本质是确定由谁来掌握权力决定对利益的分配,基于利益关系的权力的生产与分配是干部选拔制度中的核心问题,一个优良的干部选拔制度就是利益博弈各方的最佳平衡。因此,可以运用公共选择理论分析干部选拔任用制度。

On the Official Selection System from the Public Choice Theory Field

The public choice theory is one of the western economics theory formed by public choice school and developed in the 1950s. As a theory generated by the interaction between economics and politics, the study objects of public choice are same as many political science research objects, the methodology and basic methodology of both are consistent, namely： the methodology of individualism, the rational man hypothesis and taking the political process as a exchange process. Nature of cadre selection and appointment system is to determine who will grasp the power to determine the distribution of interests, the production and distribution of power based on the interest relations are the key problem in the cadre selection system, a good cadre selection system is the best balance of the interest game parties. Therefore, we can use the public choice theory to analyze the cadre selection and appointment system.