论立法机关中利益集团的产生及其作用限制

利益集团通过选举代表的方式进入立法机关。基于集体行动的理论，那些具有共同利益的利益集团的代表能够拥有较普通民众选举的代表更强的行动力和指向性，进而导致立法机关中议员代表利益集团的利益诉求而罔顾民意的情况日益严重。这种立法的卡特尔化会带来公共福利减损、立法政策偏袒等后果，还往往会造成制度的僵化。控制利益集团必须加强立法程序的建设，加强对于提案及法规违宪违法审查的监督工作，以维护立法的公正性与民主性。

Study on Emergence and Control of Interest Groups in the Legislature

Interest groups enter the legislature through electing representatives. Based on the theory of collective actions, the representatives of interest groups with common interests are stronger in action and orientation than those elected by ordinary people, and this in turn leads to the increasingly more serious situation where the representatives in the legislature represent the interest groups’ interests rather than ordinary people’s. The Cartelization of this kind of legislation will bring about such consequences as the loss of public welfare, the partiality of legislative policy, and even the institutional ossification. To control interest groups, the legislative procedure as well as the supervision of bills and review of unconstitutional law should be strengthened to maintain the fairness and democracy of legislation.