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平台动态防御信号博弈策略
引用本文:陈彤睿,王刚,马润年,王志屹,冯云.平台动态防御信号博弈策略[J].重庆邮电大学学报(自然科学版),2021,33(3):482-490.
作者姓名:陈彤睿  王刚  马润年  王志屹  冯云
作者单位:空军工程大学 信息与导航学院,西安710003;94195部队,甘肃 定西730500;空军工程大学 信息与导航学院,西安710003;空军工程大学 信息与导航学院,西安710003;93656部队,北京101100;空军工程大学 信息与导航学院,西安710003;95703部队,云南 曲靖655601
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(61573017)
摘    要:针对网络博弈中攻防双方拥有信息的不对称性,考虑攻击者据此伪装合法用户隐蔽攻击的情况,研究提出了平台动态防御的信号博弈策略.从平台动态防御原理入手,分析了网络攻防博弈关系和信息的不对称性,基于对访问者类型的推断等要素,构建了平台动态目标防御的信号博弈模型,提出了信号博弈的攻防收益量化指标,给出了信号博弈流程及均衡求解方法.通过示例和仿真分析,演示了信号博弈策略的求解过程.仿真结果表明,在攻击者类型先验概率信息已知的前提下,防御方的信号博弈策略及迁移方案,其期望收益与实际收益最终误差不超过2.7%,理论收益计算方法正确有效;较无差别平台迁移策略,信号博弈策略实际收益最终高出96%,表明该策略能够改善防御方对攻击方信息的不对称性,实施针对性的平台动态防御.

关 键 词:信号博弈  移动目标防御  平台动态防御  系统漏洞
收稿时间:2019/7/21 0:00:00
修稿时间:2021/4/25 0:00:00

Platform dynamic defense strategies based on signaling game
CHEN Tongrui,WANG Gang,MA Runnian,WANG Zhiyi,FENG Yun.Platform dynamic defense strategies based on signaling game[J].Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications,2021,33(3):482-490.
Authors:CHEN Tongrui  WANG Gang  MA Runnian  WANG Zhiyi  FENG Yun
Institution:College of Information and Navigation, Air force Engineering University, Xi''an 710003, P. R. China;Unit 94195, Dingxi 730500, P. R. China;College of Information and Navigation, Air force Engineering University, Xi''an 710003, P. R. China;Unit 93656, Beijing 101100, P. R. China; College of Information and Navigation, Air force Engineering University, Xi''an 710003, P. R. China;Unit 95703, Qujing 655601, P. R. China
Abstract:For the asymmetry of information owned by both sides in the network game, a novel signal game strategy is proposed for platform dynamic defense considering the case where an attacker disguises a legitimate user to conceal an attack. Starting from the principle of platform dynamic defense, the relationship between network attack and defense game and the asymmetry of information are analyzed, the signal game model of platform dynamic target defense is constructed based on factors such as the type of visitor, the quantitative index of attack and defense benefit of signal game is put forward, and the signal game flow and equilibrium solution method are given. Through examples and simulation analysis, the solving process of signal game strategy is demonstrated. The simulation results show that, on the premise that the prior probability information of the type of attacker is known, the signal game strategy and transfer scheme of the defense side have a final error of no more than 2.7% between the expected revenue and the actual revenue, and the theoretical revenue calculation method is correct and effective. Compared with the undifferentiated platform migration strategy, the actual return of signal game strategy is 96% higher, which indicates that this strategy can improve the asymmetry of information between the defense side and the attack side, and implement targeted platform dynamic defense.
Keywords:signaling game  moving target defense  platform dynamic defense  system vulnerability
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