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VMI模式下供应商与其下游企业的博弈分析——基于Nash和Stackelberg博弈
引用本文:王心一.VMI模式下供应商与其下游企业的博弈分析——基于Nash和Stackelberg博弈[J].科技咨询导报,2014(6):206-208.
作者姓名:王心一
作者单位:中央财经大学国际经济与贸易学院 ,北京昌平区 102206
摘    要:供应商管理库存(VMI)的模式可以有效避免供应链牛鞭效应,提高供应链整体效率.在短期内,下游企业相对更愿意实行VMI供应链模式以减少库存成本等,获取更大收益;而对供应商来说,这种模式的收益并不显著.因此,VMI模式下,供应商与下游企业之间存在一种博弈关系.本文从供应链整体收益以及利润分配等角度,综合比较、分析各类研究VMI供应链利润分配的博弈模型,系统阐释了博弈对于供应商与其下游企业之间利润分配的影响.结果表明,在Nash讨价还价模型中,双方议价能力是决定各自利润分配的主要影响;在Stackelberg博弈中,先行优势明显.最后,指出模型改进以及深入研究的方向,可从激励与补贴机制、Shapley合作博弈等角度优化博弈模型.

关 键 词:VMI利润分配  Nash  Stackelberg

Analysis of the Game between Upstream and Downstream Enterprises under the Mode of Vendor Managed Inventory——Based on the Nash and the Stackelber9 Models
Abstract:Vendor Managed Inventory is efficient in avoiding Bullwhip Effect, which can eventually improve efficiency of a whole supply chain. For downstream enterprises, they are inclined to carry out VMI mode to get more profitsl for upstream ones, profits are not always significant. On the ground of this, there can be a game between the upstream and the downstream. This paper will analyse their game mode and the allocation of profits. The results indicate that the influencing factor is garners' bargain power in Nash Model. While in Stackeiberg Model, the active one gains more. Finally, this paper points out the imperfections and direction of further research. We can have some in-depth research from perspective of incentive and subsidy mechanism and Shapley cooperative game theory.
Keywords:VMI Allocation of profits Nash Stackelberg
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