完全信息条件下股票发行政策的博弈分析

在我国股市中，政府一直承担着发展和监管股市的双重职能．因此政策成为影响股市的一个重要因素，其作用过程是政府与投资者之间进行的一场动态博弈．本文以股票发行政策为变量建立完全信息博弈模型，通过对该博弈分析，揭示相机抉择的股票发行政策使政府具有快速扩容的倾向，并在投资者理性预期下，股票发行政策不影响股价波动．

Game Analysist on Policy of Stock Issue under Complete Information

The government has to serve double function of developing and supervising simultameously in China stock Market.Therefore,it is a important factor that the polioy influence the stock market.The operating process of the policy can be described as a dynamic game between the government and investors.This paper set up a game model with the policy of the stock issue.By the analysis of the game,This paper reveals that discretion policy can enlarge the quantity of the stock issue,and can not influnce the price fluctuation under the investors` rational expection.