| 排污权交易的网上双边拍卖机制设计 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王雅娟 殷志平 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉科技大学管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071119);湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(14G114);武汉科技大学青年科技骨干培养计划项目(2014xz024) |
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| 摘 要： | 在多个排污权交易者随时到达拍卖平台投标并随时离开拍卖平台的前提下,采用网上双边拍卖模式对排污权交易进行建模,并设计了一种公平、有效的拍卖机制。该机制不仅能在完全未知将来投标序列的情况下立即对当前投标做出分配和支付的决策,而且满足激励相容性、个体理性、实时出清和弱预算平衡的要求,使得排污权从治理成本低的污染者流向治理成本高的污染者,从而降低了全社会的污染治理成本。最后通过一个排污权交易的算例描述了如何实现本文提出的网上双边拍卖机制。
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| 关 键 词： | 排污权交易 双边拍卖 拍卖机制 激励相容性 污染治理 |
Design of online double auction mechanism for emission trading |
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| Authors: | Wang Yajuan and Yin Zhiping |
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| Institution: | Wang Yajuan;Yin Zhiping;College of Management,Wuhan University of Science and Technology; |
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| Abstract: | This paper models the emission trading as an online double auction under the condition that emission traders arrive at and depart from the auction platform dynamically, and proposes a fair and efficient auction mechanism. This mechanism can not only make allocation and payment decisions about current biddings immediately without the knowledge of future bidding sequences but also satisfy the requirement of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, real-time clearing and weak budget balance. So it drives emission permits from polluters of low treatment cost to those of high treatment cost, thus reduces the pollution treatment cost of the whole society. Finally, an example of emission trading shows how to realize the proposed online double auction mechanism. |
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