首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

公司期权制度与试用期组合机制--一个人力资源信息甄别博弈模型
引用本文:蒲勇健.公司期权制度与试用期组合机制--一个人力资源信息甄别博弈模型[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版),2004,27(2):145-149.
作者姓名:蒲勇健
作者单位:重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究项目
摘    要:提出并证明试用期机制在公司选聘员工时具有一种信息甄别功能,它的优点是能对员工能力相差不大的情形进行信息甄别,克服了Spence文凭信息甄别机制的不足.还证明期权也具有一种信息甄别效应,同时还证明期权与试用期机制的组合能降低公司的甄别成本.还给出了公司试用期和期权与试用期组合机制设计的数学原理.

关 键 词:人力资源管理  博弈论  信息经济学
文章编号:1000-582X(2004)02-0145-05
修稿时间:2003年9月13日

A Game Theory Model on the Information Screen Effect of Compose of Option and Probation Period Mechanism
PU Yong-jian.A Game Theory Model on the Information Screen Effect of Compose of Option and Probation Period Mechanism[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Natural Science Edition),2004,27(2):145-149.
Authors:PU Yong-jian
Abstract:We have put forward a theory that the probation period mechanism have an information screening function when a company is inviting applications for job, which would be a supplement for the spence model. One of the merits of the model is that it could screen the informations of employee's capacity when there are fewer differences between the capacities of employees. This paper also has proved that option mechanism has a information screening effect and the compose of option and probation period mechanism could decrease the screen cost of a company. We have derived the mathematical Principles of probation period mechanism and the compose of option and probation period mechanism design in the paper.
Keywords:human resource management  game theory  information economics
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《重庆大学学报(自然科学版)》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《重庆大学学报(自然科学版)》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号