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对城市拆迁中补偿标准的探讨
引用本文:户邑,彭小兵,刘贵文.对城市拆迁中补偿标准的探讨[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版),2005,28(6):133-135.
作者姓名:户邑  彭小兵  刘贵文
作者单位:重庆大学,建设管理与房地产学院,重庆,400030;重庆大学,贸易与行政学院,重庆,400030
摘    要:城市拆迁是中国近几年来的热点问题,拆迁补偿标准偏低被认为是引发拆迁纠纷的主要原因之一.通过建立开发商与被拆迁户两局中人博弈的模型,求解该博弈的混合策略纳什均衡,并分析提高补偿标准对纳什均衡的影响.研究表明,政府单纯出台提高补偿标准的政策,短期内可使被拆迁户受益,但长期的政策效果却降低了拆迁的发生率,减缓了旧城改造的步伐.

关 键 词:城市拆迁  补偿标准  博弈论  政策效果
文章编号:1000-582X(2005)06-0133-03
修稿时间:2004年12月20

Study on Compensation Standard of the Urban House Dismantlement Based on Game Theory
HU Yi,PENG Xiao-bing,LIU Gui-wen.Study on Compensation Standard of the Urban House Dismantlement Based on Game Theory[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Natural Science Edition),2005,28(6):133-135.
Authors:HU Yi  PENG Xiao-bing  LIU Gui-wen
Abstract:It is a hot question in recent years in China about the urban house dismantlement and development, and the low compensation standard of the urban house dismantlement has been thought to be the main reason that cause dispute of the urban house dismantlement. After a two-player game model is built, the paper solves mix-strategy Nash equilibrium of game and analyzes the influence of improving compensation to game equilibrium. It is concluded that, if government only improve policy of compensation standard to issue, the resident ready to move with their house to be dismantled can enjoy the great benefit shortly, but the long-term policy result is to reduce the incidence of the urban house dismantlement and slow down paces that the old city transforms.
Keywords:the urban house dismantlement  compensation standard of the urban house dismantlement  game theory  policy effect
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