基于二层决策的第三方物流分包合同设计

针对第三方物流提供者如何设计有效的激励机制既避免分包商的败德行为,又促使分包商不断提升服务绩效直至第三方物流的整体绩效最佳的问题.通过引入二层规划的研究方法,假定分包合同决策变量为外生变量的前提下,构建合同双方博弈的Nash均衡模型;进一步在Nash均衡的约束下,分析决策变量为内生变量时的最优解,从而把目前局限于委托代理层面的分包合同关系研究推进到了委托代理与合同整体绩效最优决策相结合的层面.

Third-party Logistics Subcontract Design Based on Bilevel Programming

The research theme of this paper is about how third-party logistics provider design a kind of effective incentive mechanism which can not only avoid the moral hazard behavior of the subcontractor , but also promote subcontractor to raise the serving performance constantly, until obtaining the best TPL performance .Through building bilevel programming model where constructing the Nash equilibrium model this paper, the anthors assume subcontract decision variable as endogenetic variable first, and then analyze the optimal solution with the restraint of Nash equilibrium at the time of decision variable as exogenous variable, push the subcontract relationship research at the principal-agent level into the lay that principal-agent combining with whole contract performance optimal decision.