基于隐性边合约的团队合作激励机制

针对团队激励内在的搭便车问题，以动态博弈论为分析工具，通过引入团队生产中存在横向监督这一合理假设条件，研究设计了一种基于隐性边合约的团队合作动态激励机制．理论分析表明，这种在第一阶段采用严格群体激励相容合约，在第二阶段采用个体激励相容合约的动态激励机制．通过两阶段重复博弈就能够在风险回避和随机生产过程的一般条件下唯一地实施团队合作．

Incentive Mechanism for Team Cooperation Based on Implicit Side Contract

Aiming at the free-riding problem in team incentive, this paper designs a dynamic incentive mechanism based on implicit side contract with dynamic game theory by introducing the reasonable assumption that there is horizontal monitor in team production. The theoretic analysis indicates that the dynamic incentive mechanism, in which a strict group incentive compatibility contract is taken at the first stage and an individual incentive compatibility contract is taken at the second stage, can implement team cooperation uniquely in the general condition of risk aversion and stochastic production by only two stage repeated game.