政府采购组合拍卖机制

多物品采购活动常常可以通过组合拍卖的方式进行，称为采购组合拍卖．在政府的公共品采购组合拍卖中，拍卖的社会福利应该是拍卖机制研究的中心问题．相应的机制必须既考虑作为投标者的供应商的利益，又考虑作为拍卖者的采购商的利益．既要考虑类似于正向组合拍卖的支付方式和分配方式的设计，又要考虑采购活动独特的质量标准选择，使得整个经济系统的利润最大化．为此，选取了使得系统利润最大化的分配目标设计相应的采购组合拍卖机制，并通过对供应商的激励相容和个体理性特征的证明，说明了该机制能够保证供应商投标的真实性和积极性；通过预算平衡性质的证明，显示了该机制不需要外部的资源补贴。

Government Procurement Combinatorial Auction Mechanism

Procurement for various items in enterprises is often implemented by combinatorial auctions, which is also called procurement combinatorial auctions. The authors propose MA-VCG, an efficient multi-attributes procurement combinatorial auction, in which agents will bid for combinational supply of items with truthful report. Besides incentive compatible, MA-VCG also holds the budget balance and individual rationality. Especially, the important characteristic of MA-VCG is that the mechanism focuses on the system gross utility as the optimization goal. The goal is and unique in procurement combinatorial auctions.