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信息不对称下医患关系博弈分析
引用本文:弓宪文,王勇,李廷玉.信息不对称下医患关系博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版),2004,27(4):126-129.
作者姓名:弓宪文  王勇  李廷玉
作者单位:重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 重庆 400030,重庆 400030,重庆 400030
摘    要:医疗市场中医患双方处于信息高度不对称状态,这将导致道德风险和逆向选择,降低市场效率.通过建立博弈模型,对信息不对称下医患双方的博弈过程及均衡结果进行了分析,并提出了相应对策建议.分析表明,医患信息高度不对称不利于患者的利益及医疗市场的发展,应当建立医疗信息公示制度,加强医患沟通,缓解医患信息不对称状态.

关 键 词:医疗市场  信息不对称  逆向选择  道德风险  医患博弈
文章编号:1000-582X(2004)04-0126-04
修稿时间:2003年2月25日

Game of Hospital-tient Relationship Under Asymmetric Information
GONG Xian-wen,WANG Yong,LI Ting-yu.Game of Hospital-tient Relationship Under Asymmetric Information[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Natural Science Edition),2004,27(4):126-129.
Authors:GONG Xian-wen  WANG Yong  LI Ting-yu
Abstract:The hospital and patient are in the state of asymmetric information in the medical market, which could lead to moral hazard, adverse selection, and low market efficiency. By the game model, we analyze the game process and equilibrium between the hospital and patient under the condition of asymmetric information. The analyzing result suggest that asymmetric information in the medical market is harmful to the patient's benefit and the development of the medical market. Therefore, it's necessary to set up medical information opening system and strengthen the communication between the hospital and the patient so as to relieve the asymmetric information between hospital and patient.
Keywords:medical market  asymmetric information  adverse selection  moral hazard  game between hospital and patient
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