学术失范的制度经济学分析

社会与学术人员之间存在委托-代理关系，由于双方信息不对称、契约的不完全性及人的有限理性．学术失范是不可避免的。学术失范是低投入、高收益的行为，并能形成“马太效应”。制度经济学的一个最鲜明的原则是制度的设计要顺应人的自利性。立足于制度经济学，解决学术失范问题，要对学术机构和学术人员设置恰当的激励和约束机制，使他们的努力与其获得的报酬相接，同时制定各种规则来约束和限制他们的失范行为。

An Analysis of Academic Misconducts by Institutional Economics

There exists a relationship of trustor- agent between the society and the academic personnel. There are unavoidably academic misconducts because of the information asymmetry of two parties, the incomphteness of contract and the limited rationality of human beings. Academic misconducts are behavior of low investment but high benefit, and can lead to ＂Matthew Effect＂. A most conspicuous principle of institutional economies is that the design of institution should comply with the man＇s serf- benefiting： In order to solve the problems of academic misconducts, it is necessary to base oneself on institutional economies, adopt appropriate meamares of encouragement and limitation to academic institutes and academic personnel, which can make their efforts match their rewards, and set up kinds of regulations to restrainand limit their academic misconducts.