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电子政务信息资源共享的重复博弈分析
引用本文:颜志军,毕海玲.电子政务信息资源共享的重复博弈分析[J].北京理工大学学报,2011,31(1):122-126.
作者姓名:颜志军  毕海玲
作者单位:北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京,100081
基金项目:国家自然科学基金,国家教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目
摘    要:研究电子政务信息资源共享中由于部门之间的利益冲突而面临的"信息孤岛"问题.从经济学角度入手,建立了电子政务信息资源共享博弈模型,基于KMRW定理分析了不同部门在不完全信息下的共享策略,探讨了多阶段博弈场景下的信息共享条件,研究了信息补贴策略的应用条件和应用方式.研究结果表明,政府应通过减少共享成本、建立部门间长期合作关系和采用信息补贴策略促进政府信息资源共享.

关 键 词:电子政务  信息资源共享  重复博弈
收稿时间:2009/11/30 0:00:00

Analysis on the E-government Information Resources Sharing by Repeated Game Theory
YAN Zhi-jun and BI Hai-ling.Analysis on the E-government Information Resources Sharing by Repeated Game Theory[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Natural Science Edition),2011,31(1):122-126.
Authors:YAN Zhi-jun and BI Hai-ling
Institution:School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China;School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China
Abstract:This work analyzes the "information isolated island" problem in E-government information resources sharing. From the economic point, the incomplete information repeated game model was proposed. The information sharing mechanism and condition were discussed based on KMRW theory. Furthermore, the stratagem of applying subsidy policy for information resources sharing was explored. The results show that the government should minimize the sharing cost, help to establish the long-term cooperation relationship among departments and use the information subsidy policy to promote information resources sharing.
Keywords:E-government  information resources sharing  repeated game theory
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