农超对接模式下的质量预防策略

研究了农超对接模式下农民专业合作社的质量预防策略.将农民专业合作社在信息对称下的质量决策与信息不对称下的质量决策进行对比,重点研究农民专业合作社在信息不对称下的质量决策,利用最优控制理论与拉格朗日条件极值得出了信息不对称下质量决策的最优解.结果表明:农民专业合作社以次充好所产生的暴利越大,其质量预防量就越小,从而越容易产生投机的心理来以次充好牟取暴利;信息不对称情况下,超市评价水平的不可观测增加了农民专业合作社的质量预防成本,减少了农民专业合作社的质量收益.

Quality Prevention Strategies in the Model of Agriculture-Super Docking

The quality prevention strategy of the famer specialized cooperatives was studied in the model of agriculture-super docking. The quality decision of the famer specialized cooperatives will be compared in the case of information symmetry and information asymmetry. The study was focused on the quality decision of the famer specialized cooperatives under the asymmetric information. The optimal solution of quality decision was obtained by the optimal control theory and Lagrange conditional extreme value under the asymmetric information. The results show that the more profit the famer specialized cooperatives generate by selling shoddy, the smaller amount of the quality prevention will be. In that case, the famer specialized cooperatives are easier to produce speculative psychology of selling shoddy. Under the asymmetric information situation, because the evaluating standard of supermarket is unobservable, the quality prevention costs of the famer specialized cooperatives will increase, the quality revenue of the famer specialized cooperatives will reduce.