服务质量约束下网络商店与物流服务商协调模型

针对网络商店和第三方物流(TPL)形成的服务供需关系,引入反映第三方物流服务质量的配送完好率因素.在产品需求是价格和配送完好率函数的条件下,建立了非合作博弈和合作博弈下的决策模型.对两种决策模型进行对比分析,指出传统合同的不足,而所设计的收益共享契约能实现供应链协调.算例分析进一步验证了提升服务质量有利于增加供应链总收益,且通过选择恰当的收益分配系数能使双方收益实现帕累托最优,并给出了分配系数的范围.此外,研究还表明协调契约能有效激励第三方物流企业降低服务报价并激励网络商店降低商品价格.

Contract Coordination Mechanism Between Online Store and TPL Under Iogistics Service Quality Constraint

Considering the supply-demand relationship among online store and TPL (third party logistics), this paper introduced the concept of the distribution perfectness ratio, which can reflect the service quality of TPL. A non-cooperative game model and a cooperative game model were constructed, with the assumption of the market demand function depending on the product price and perfectness ratio of distribution. Some shortcomings of traditional contract were pointed out after comparing and analyzing the two decision models. It also demonstrated that the redesigned contract can achieve supply chain coordination. Computational example analysis results show that improving logistics service quality is helpful for increasing the total revenue of the supply chain. It also shows that the Pareto optimality can be realized by selecting proper benefit allotting coefficients. The range of benefit allotting coefficients can be also determined correspondingly. Additionally, this paper shows that coordination contract can effectively motivate TPL to decrease the service price and can also motivate online stores to decrease product price as well.