上下游企业的兼并选择策略

建立了上下游各有两个企业的竞争模型，分析企业在可以以横向兼并和纵向兼并为策略变量时的对策均衡。结果表明，当上下游企业可以以横向兼并和纵向兼并为策略变量进行对策时，上下游企业分别横向兼并是子博弈精炼纳什均衡。同时讨论了政府、企业和消费者三方在兼并中的利益冲突。

The Decision Strategies on Merger of Upstream and Downstream Firms

The decision strategies on merger of the upstream and dowstream firms in an industry are discussed in this paper. A competition model with two firms in both upstream and downstream is established. The a nalysis will show that when the upstream and downstream enterprises take the hor izontal and vertical merging as strategies variables, the subgame perfect equili brium is the upstream and downstream enterprises' horizontal merger respectively . Furthermore, the paper focuses on the conflict of interests among the ente rprises, the government and the consumers in the merger.