管理者信息披露的委托—代理模型

为了研究当管理者的能力类型和努力都是不可观察时的最优激励方案,建立了一个管理者的信息披露模型.在模型中,企业主和管理者都是风险中性的,企业主是委托人,管理者是代理人.有两个约束,一个是激励相容约束(IC),即在最优契约下,管理者可以通过披露真实的能力类型最大化其效用,另一个是个人理性约束(IR).企业主在两个约束下最大化其预期效用.根据显示原理,采用最优控制理论求解模型.在一些条件下,若能力水平越高,则最优工资越高,最优努力越多;若竞争度越高,则最优工资越低,最优努力越少.

Principal-agent model on information revelation of manager

In order to study the optimal incentive schemes when both manager's ability type and effort are unobservable, this paper sets up an information revelation model of manager. In the model, both owner and manager are risk-neutral, and the owner is the principal and the manager is the agent. There are two constraints, one is the incentive-compatibility constraint (IC), i.e., the manager may maximize his utility by revealing truthfully his ability type in the optimal contract. The other is the individual-rationality constraint (IR). The owner maximizes his expected utility under the two constraints. Following the revelation principle, we solves the model by employing the optimal control theory. Under some conditions, the higher the ability level is, the higher the optimal wage and the more the optimal effort. The higher the degree of competition is, the lower the optimal wage and the less the optimal effort.