| 我国农业面源污染治理的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 卢亚丽,薛惠锋.我国农业面源污染治理的博弈分析[J].农业系统科学与综合研究,2007,23(3):268-271. |
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| 作者姓名： | 卢亚丽 薛惠锋 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西安理工大学,工商管理学院,陕西,西安,710054
2. 西安理工大学,工商管理学院,陕西,西安,710054;西北工业大学,资源与环境信息化工程研究所,陕西,西安,710072 |
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| 摘 要： | 关于日趋严重而至今尚未得到普遍重视的农业面源污染问题,针对政府、村集体和农民3个主体的治理行为进行了博弈分析,得出各主体在农业面源污染治理中缺乏相应的制度保障和激励约束机制的结论,提出了在农业面源污染治理中必须加强政府与农民的合作和农民之间的相互合作的建议,结合实例利用shapely值确定了各个主体方在农业面源污染治理费用中的合理分摊问题。表1,参12。
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| 关 键 词： | 农业面源污染 联盟博弈 shapely值 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-0068（2007）03-0268-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-11-01 |
Game Analysis on the Control of Agricultural Non-point Source Pollution in China |
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| LU Ya-li,XUE Hui-feng.Game Analysis on the Control of Agricultural Non-point Source Pollution in China[J].System Sciemces and Comprehensive Studies In Agriculture,2007,23(3):268-271. |
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| Authors: | LU Ya-li XUE Hui-feng |
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| Abstract: | The problem of agricultural non-point source pollution is more severe than before,but with less recognition.This paper analyzes the behavior of pollution control of three main bodies of government,village community and farmers on agricultural non-point source pollution in China by game theory.It is concluded that it is short of system guarantee and the mechanism of inspiriting and regulating.So the idea of strengthening the cooperation between government and farmers and the cooperation among farmers is put forward.An example is given at last for how to make sure of sharing on charge in agricultural non-point source pollution by shapely value. |
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| Keywords: | the control of agricultural non-point source pollution coalition game shapely value |
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