土地利用监测策略对策论模型

通过处罚力度等因子构建中央政府与地方的对策论模型,从经济学角度分析国家应当采用的监测频率策略,综合考虑了经济效益和社会效益,同时分析了地方可能发生的用地违法频率.最后,举例演示了所建立模型的具体应用.

Modeling the Decision-making Using Game Theory in Monitoring Land-use Practice in China

Using remote sensing technology becomes an important method for monitoring the land-use practice in China. For pursuing economic benefits, the local governments often implement various development programs by using state land illegally, thus it is essential to identify these illegal cases in using proper techniques such as remote sensing technology. The identification of those illegal cases will help government to adopt necessary punishment measures. It is believed that sufficient punishment measures will bring down the number of cases in using land illegally. In other words, increasing monitoring frequency will be able to control the land use practice. This paper is to build up a model using Game Theory for finding out an optimal monitoring frequency which enable the proper control over land use and at the same keep the monitoring costs to the minimum level. The model balances the monitoring frequency and the possibility of committing illegally land use by the local governments. A hypothetical example is presented to demonstrate the application of the model.