合作创新的领导权博弈与利益协调研究

研究了合作创新的权力结构对知识创造及创新绩效的作用机理.考虑上下游企业合作创新的知识共享、创造及利益分配过程,界定权力均衡(LS)、上游企业领导(UL)、下游企业领导(DL)等领导权博弈模型并进行创新效率分析.研究发现:权力结构影响合作创新效率,LS模式下企业的知识产出与供应链利润优于UL、DL模式;企业的知识溢出既可提高合作伙伴的知识产出与创新利润,也存在知识外溢损失风险,UL、DL模式下领导者(跟随者)知识溢出与其创新利润正(负)相关,LS模式下企业的知识溢出与其创新利润呈"倒U型"关系;创新贡献率是引起合作利益冲突的主要原因,使用Nash协商模型检验了通过协商机制解决利益协调问题的有效性,比较发现LS模式的利益协调效果优于UL、DL模式.最后,讨论了研究的管理启示.

Leadership game and benefit coordination in cooperative innovation

This study investigates the effect of power structure on cooperative innovation performance between upstream and downstream firms. Based on resource dependence theory, 3 modes of power structure are defined as power balance or leaderless structure (LS), upstream firm leading (UL) and downstream firm leading (DL), in order to analyze the efficiency of knowledge sharing, knowledge creation and benefit distribution. Results indicate that the ‘symmetric dependence relationship’ of LS mode has innovation efficiency advantage compared to the ‘asymmetric dependence relationship’ of UL/DL modes; power structure affects knowledge spillover efficiency, in UL and DL modes leader's (follower) profit is positively (negatively) related to its knowledge spillover, in LS mode firm's knowledge spillover and profit show an ‘inverted U-shaped’ trajectory; contribution level of innovation is the main factor causing benefit conflicts among cooperative organizations; using Nash bargaining model as coordination mechanism can lead to a Pareto improvement of cooperative innovation performance, the benefit coordination effect of LS mode is better than UL and DL mode. Finally, we discuss the implications of our study for the issue of open innovation governance.