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生产成本信息不对称下零售商风险厌恶的回购契约
引用本文:刘浪,汪惠,黄冬宏.生产成本信息不对称下零售商风险厌恶的回购契约[J].系统工程理论与实践,2021,41(1):113-123.
作者姓名:刘浪  汪惠  黄冬宏
作者单位:华东交通大学 经济管理学院, 南昌 330013
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71562013);江西省自然科学基金(20181BAA208041)
摘    要:探索在市场价格随机条件下,生产成本信息不对称零售商风险厌恶时,采用回购契约协调二级供应链的内在规律.构建新的条件下的回购契约模型并求解,分析信息不对称和风险厌恶对供应链上各决策变量的影响.通过算例仿真进行了验证,研究结果发现:在市场价格随机条件下,不管生产成本信息是否对称,只要零售商存在风险厌恶,供应链上各决策变量都会发生分岔突变的现象;不管零售商是否风险厌恶,生产成本信息不对称都会给供应商带来额外的收益,但会损害零售商与整个供应链的收益;信息越不对称,供应链上的各种决策变量在分岔突变区域的振幅越大.结论是:分岔突变现象是价格随机条件下,参与者风险厌恶时存在的一种特有现象;供应商能够通过隐瞒私人信息带来额外的收益,但损害零售商和供应链的利益;零售商应对生产成本信息不对称的最好办法就是以最低的成本使生产成本信息透明;零售商以平稳的心态面对各种外部风险,更有利于科学决策.

关 键 词:市场价格随机  生产成本信息不对称  风险厌恶  回购契约  分岔突变现象
收稿时间:2019-03-28

Buy-back contracts of retailer risk aversion under asymmetric information of production cost
LIU Lang,WANG Hui,HUANG Donghong.Buy-back contracts of retailer risk aversion under asymmetric information of production cost[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2021,41(1):113-123.
Authors:LIU Lang  WANG Hui  HUANG Donghong
Institution:School of Economics and Management, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013, China
Abstract:To explore the internal law of secondary supply chain coordination by buy-back contract under the condition of price randomness and retailer risk aversion with asymmetric production cost information. A buy-back contract model under new conditions is constructed and solved to analyze the impact of information asymmetry and risk aversion on each decision variable in the supply chain. The simulation results show that under the condition of price randomness, no matter the information is symmetrical or not, as long as the retailer has risk aversion, every decision variable in the supply chain will have bifurcation mutation. No matter whether the retailer is risk averse or not, the asymmetric information of production cost will bring additional benefits to the supplier, but it will damage the benefits of the retailer and the whole supply chain as well. The more asymmetric the information is, the greater the amplitude of various decision variables in the bifurcation mutation region will achieve. The conclusion is that the bifurcation mutation is a special phenomenon after the price randomness and the participants' risk aversion coupling. Supplier can generate additional revenue by withholding private information, but at the expense of retailer and supply chains; The best way for retailer to deal with the asymmetric information of production cost is to make the information of production cost transparent at the lowest cost. Retailer face various external risks with a stable attitude, which is more conducive to scientific decision-making.
Keywords:stochastic market price  asymmetric production cost information  risk aversion  buy-back contract  bifurcation mutation phenomenon  
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