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基于可竞争市场理论的输电市场管制机制设计
引用本文:王先甲,韩东,王广民.基于可竞争市场理论的输电市场管制机制设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(6):111-116.
作者姓名:王先甲  韩东  王广民
作者单位:武汉大学,系统工程研究所,武汉,430072
基金项目:国家自然科学基金;国家青年哲学社会科学基金
摘    要:目前中国输配电市场是高度垄断市场,垄断导致生产低效率和较高的垄断电价.为解决这一问题,本文根据可竞争市场理论的思想,运用激励理论原理,从政府管制政策的角度,分析在电力市场输电环节,允许电力直供模式后,对电网公司和发电企业之间契约设计以及对电力输送环节垄断的影响.电力直供促进了输电环节的竞争,增加社会的电量供给,促进电网企业提高生产效率,降低生产成本,使社会的整体福利水平得到帕累托改进.

关 键 词:电力市场  可竞争市场理论  政府管制  输电市场竞争
文章编号:1000-6788(2007)06-0111-06
修稿时间:2006年1月6日

Regulation Mechanism Design for Transmission Market based on Contestable Markets Theory
WANG Xian-jia,HAN Dong,WANG Guang-min.Regulation Mechanism Design for Transmission Market based on Contestable Markets Theory[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2007,27(6):111-116.
Authors:WANG Xian-jia  HAN Dong  WANG Guang-min
Abstract:At present,the distribution and transmission market is still a high monopoly market,which induces lower productive efficiency and higher monopoly price.In order to solve such questions,this paper applies incentive theory to analyze the contract design between the grid company and the electric power plants when electric direct-supplying is permitted.The analyses are based on contestable markets theory and from the perspective of the regulation.The electric direct-supplying promotes the competition in the electric transmission market and improves electric supplement,hastens the grid company to improve productive efficiency and to reduce productive costs.The direct-supply also meliorates the whole welfare of the society.
Keywords:electricity market  theory of contestable markets  regulation  transmission completion
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