| 双寡头零售市场的演化稳定策略 |
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| 引用本文： | 石岿然,肖条军.双寡头零售市场的演化稳定策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004,24(12):24-28. |
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| 作者姓名： | 石岿然 肖条军 |
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| 作者单位： | (1)南京大学工程管理学院;(2)南京工业大学理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(70301014，70171028) |
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| 摘 要： | 在一个三阶段Hotelling博弈模型的基础上研究双寡头零售市场价格策略的演化稳定问题.在0,1]线性城市模型中,两家零售商在第一阶段同时选择价格策略变量,第二阶段确定价格的大小及相应的定价概率,第三阶段由消费者选择零售商.应用演化博弈论进行分析,得到了价格促销策略为双寡头零售市场的唯一演化稳定策略的结论.
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| 关 键 词： | 双寡头零售市场 价格策略 演化博弈论 演化稳定策略 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-6788(2004)12-0024-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年1月15日 |
Evolutionary Stable Strategy of Duopolistic Retailing Market |
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| SHI Kui-ran.Evolutionary Stable Strategy of Duopolistic Retailing Market[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2004,24(12):24-28. |
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| Authors: | SHI Kui-ran |
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| Institution: | (1)School of Management Science and Engineering,Nanjing University;(2)School of Sciences,Nanjing University of Technology |
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| Abstract: | Based on a three-stage Hotelling model, we study the evolutionary stable problem of price strategies in duopolistic retailing market. In the \ linear city game, two firms simultaneously choose their strategic variable in the first stage and determine the levels of their strategic variables and the corresponding probability of their price strategy in the second stage. In the third stage, consumers choose the firms. By using evolutionary game theory, we obtain the result that the High/Low pricing strategy is the unique evolutionary stable strategy. |
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| Keywords: | duopolistic retailing market price strategy evolutionary game theory evolutionary stable strategy |
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