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道德风险约束下的最优融资结构——动态金融契约研究综述
引用本文:郑军,李仲飞,丁杰.道德风险约束下的最优融资结构——动态金融契约研究综述[J].系统工程理论与实践,2020,40(8):2159-2175.
作者姓名:郑军  李仲飞  丁杰
作者单位:1. 广东财经大学 金融学院, 广州 510320;2. 中山大学 管理学院, 广州 510275
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71721001,71991474);国家社会科学基金(18BJY062);广东省哲学社会科学规划项目(GD15YYJ06)
摘    要:债务违约、企业资金链断裂与破产,以及宏观层面的金融危机等经济金融现象促使经济学家反思金融契约的资源配置效率与风险问题.以契约理论的建模技术为逻辑主线,以信息非对称环境中最优契约设计与融资结构优化为关注对象,结合融资结构、资产定价与道德风险之间的内在联系,对动态金融契约理论的研究方法与研究成果进行了系统评述,并根据金融契约理论发展逻辑导出公司金融与资产定价的理论融合方向.基于理论发展路径,初步探讨了动态金融契约理论的未来拓展方向,并结合当前我国经济结构特点给出了该理论的应用前景.

关 键 词:融资结构  动态道德风险  契约设计  资产定价  
收稿时间:2019-11-28

Optimal financing structure with moral hazard constraint:A review of dynamic financial contract
ZHENG Jun,LI Zhongfei,DING Jie.Optimal financing structure with moral hazard constraint:A review of dynamic financial contract[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2020,40(8):2159-2175.
Authors:ZHENG Jun  LI Zhongfei  DING Jie
Institution:1. School of Finance, Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, Guangzhou 510320, China;2. School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Abstract:Debt default, enterprise capital chain rupture and bankruptcy, as well as financial crisis have prompted economists to reflect on the efficiency and risk of financial contract. Taking the development of contract theory and technology as a logical clue, and the optimal contract design and optimization of financing structure in the asymmetric information finance environment as key research object, combining the inherent relationship between financing structure, asset pricing and moral risk, this paper makes a systematically review of the research methods and results of dynamic financial contract theory, and refines the ideas of constructing the unified theoretical system of research on corporate finance and asset pricing. Based on the theoretical development path, the paper discusses the future development direction of the dynamic financial contract theory, and gives the application prospect of the theory according to the characteristics of China's economic structure.
Keywords:financing structure  dynamic moral hazard  contract design  assets pricing  
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