灰色市场下考虑非对称信息的制造商质量披露及定价策略

针对灰色市场条件下产品质量为非对称信息的情形,构建由一个制造商、一个灰色市场投机者和顾客组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了制造商的质量披露及定价策略.研究表明,在产品质量和低价市场顾客支付意愿较低时,制造商的质量披露策略是向顾客隐藏质量信息,反之则向顾客披露质量信息;在定价策略方面,随着低价市场顾客支付意愿的提高,制造商可通过不断缩小高、低价两个市场的价格差与灰市投机者进行竞争.进一步地,通过与产品质量对称信息情形对比分析发现,虽然非对称信息情形下制造商具有信息优势,但制造商不一定能够获得更高的利润,且其利润并不总是受到灰市投机者的影响.最后,通过将模型进一步扩展到制造商进行质量研发,即质量为内生时的情形,结果表明上述研究结论具有较好的一致性和普适性,可为灰色市场下制造商质量披露与定价提供有益的管理启示.

Quality disclosure and pricing strategies of the manufacturer with asymmetric information under gray market

With respect to the asymmetric information of product quality under gray market, we construct a Stackelberg game model composed of one manufacturer, one speculator and customers to study the quality disclosure and pricing strategies. The results show that when product quality and customer's willingness-to-pay are low, the manufacturer's quality disclosure strategy is to hide quality information from customers. Otherwise, the manufacturer will disclose quality information to customers. In terms of pricing strategy, the manufacturer can compete with gray market speculator by continuously narrowing the price gap between high and low price markets as customers' willingness-to-pay increases. Further, compared with the case that product quality is symmetric information, although the manufacturer has information advantages in the case of asymmetric information, he/she cannot guarantee a higher profit, and his/her profit is not always affected by gray market speculator. Finally, extending the model to the case when the quality investment of the manufacturer is endogenous, we find that the above conclusions have good consistency and versatility, which can provide useful managerial insights for the quality disclosure and pricing of the manufacturer under gray market.