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引入信号装置的地铁安检反恐博弈模型
引用本文:李德龙,刘德海,王雷.引入信号装置的地铁安检反恐博弈模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2020,40(1):134-149.
作者姓名:李德龙  刘德海  王雷
作者单位:1. 东北财经大学 管理科学与工程学院, 大连 116025;2. 中国刑事警察学院 治安学系, 沈阳 110854
基金项目:国家重点研发计划"公共安全风险防控与应急技术装备"重点专项课题(2018YFC0807500);国家自然科学基金(71874024,71571033,91747105,71571035,71503033,71602021)
摘    要:地铁运输面临着提高安检通过效率、加强地铁安全及降低乘客安检成本的需求权衡.通过在安检处加载可诱导潜在袭击者执行"主动丢弃"策略的信号装置,构建了地铁安检部门与潜在袭击者之间的地铁安检反恐博弈模型,实现了对安检通过效率的动态调节,基于对乘客淤滞风险的研究,提出了客流淤滞分级响应机制,并得出了安检部门的策略触发条件.通过分析得出,当潜在袭击者自弃效用低于预期时,安检部门应执行"更新较强信号"策略;当自弃效用高于预期,但安检通过效率低于预期时,应执行"更新较强信号"策略;当自弃效用和安检通过效率均高于预期时,应执行"更新较弱信号"策略;当自弃效用和安检通过效率均满足预期时,应执行"不更新"策略.加载信号装置并引入客流淤滞分级响应机制后,乘客的淤滞量明显变小、排队成本大幅下降、乘客安检成本显著降低.

关 键 词:信号博弈  反恐  地铁安检  自弃效用  安检通过效率
收稿时间:2018-08-17

Anti-terrorism game model of subway security screening with signal device
LI Delong,LIU Dehai,WANG Lei.Anti-terrorism game model of subway security screening with signal device[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2020,40(1):134-149.
Authors:LI Delong  LIU Dehai  WANG Lei
Institution:1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China;2. Department of Public Security, Criminal Investigation Police University of China, Shenyang 110854, China
Abstract:Metro transportation is faced with the need of improving the efficiency of security checks, enhancing subway safety and reducing the cost of passenger security screening. By loading signal devices at security checkpoints which can induce potential attackers to choose the "active discarding" strategy, we constructed a game model between subway security screening department and potential attackers, which can dynamically adjust the passing efficiency of security screening. At the same time, based on the study of the risk of passenger siltation, a game model of subway security screening and anti-terrorism is proposed. The hierarchical response mechanism of passenger flow stagnation is obtained, and the strategy triggering conditions of the security inspection department are obtained. It is concluded that when the self-abandonment effect of potential attackers is lower than expected, the security screening departments should implement the strategy of "updating stronger signal"; when the self-abandonment effect is higher than expected, but the passing efficiency of security inspection is lower than expected, the security screening departments should implement the strategy of "updating stronger signal"; when the self-abandonment effect and the passing efficiency of security inspection are higher than expected, the security screening departments should implement the strategy of "Update Weaker Signal" policy; when both the self-abandonment utility and the security pass efficiency meet expectations, the security screening departments should implement the strategy of "Not Update". After loading signal device and introducing passenger flow stagnation grading response mechanism, the passenger stagnation amount is obviously reduced, the queuing cost is greatly reduced, and the passenger security cost is significantly reduced.
Keywords:signaling game  anti-terrorism  subway security screening  self abandoned utility  security check efficiency  
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