考虑引入渠道竞争的双渠道信号传递策略

在一个存在高低两种类型制造商的供应链中,通过对制造商向零售商进行信号传递策略的研究,把制造商引入渠道竞争的动机解释为"渠道竞争"及"信息非对称"两种效应.把零售商努力纳入需求函数,建模分析了不完全信息条件下单(双)渠道供应链中制造商通过调整入场费和批发价进行信号传递的决策.并在此基础上通过两种渠道模式下供应链成员决策参数的对比,重点分析了渠道入侵对信号传递策略两种效应的综合影响.研究发现:两种模式下,制造商都需要通过向上扭曲批发价、降低支付给零售商的入场费来进行信号传递,同时零售商会减少附加值服务的提供;但当满足一定条件时,制造商可以通过引入线上直销渠道降低批发价向上扭曲的概率(即更容易实现自然分离),并减少信号传递成本;产品需求波动性、需求对零售商提供附加服务的敏感性以及渠道间竞争强度都将在一定程度上影响引入渠道竞争的效果.

Dual-channel signaling strategy with channel competition

This study investigated signaling strategy of a manufacture (he), who tries to convince his retailer (she) of the high-demand potential of his products, considering channel competition (open a direct online channel). And we explained the incentives of the launch of the manufacture's direct online channel as two effects:channel-competition effect and information-asymmetry effect. In this paper we incorporated retailer's value-added services into a model, to analyze how the manufacture uses wholesale prices and slotting allowances to practice his signaling strategy under asymmetric information, in a single-and dual-channel, respectively. Based on this, comparing the players' decisions under two channel formats, we examined the comprehensive impact of channel competition on the two effects during signaling. Our results suggest that:in these two channel structures, a upward distortion of wholesale prices and a downward distortion of slotting allowances occur when a manufacture signals his demand to the retailer, who reduces her services meanwhile; if some conditions are satisfied, channel competition can pin down the distortion of wholesale prices (i.e., a natural separation arises more easily) and the signaling costs; demand volatility, service elasticity of demand and intensity of channel competition can influence the performance of channel encroachment to some extent.