基于期权采购的政企联合储备应急物资模型

政企联合储备应急物资能够有效地改善政府单独储备物资所面临的储备过量或不足的困境,而通过市场化的契约机制实现政企联合储备可以克服行政强制手段带来的弊端.基于此,本文建立了基于期权采购的政企联合储备应急物资模型,通过推导获得政企双方的最优决策后,给出了企业参与联合储备的条件,以及在不同的现货市场条件下,与政府单独储备模式相比,政企联合储备模式能够提高物资总储备量且降低政府库存水平时契约参数的取值范围.在此基础上,本文给出了供应链达到协调以及政企双方实现合作共赢时的条件.最后,本文通过数值模拟对上述结论进行了验证,并进一步研究物资需求量不确定性对两种储备模式的影响,结果表明随着需求量不确定性的增加,与政府单独储备模式相比,政企联合储备模式的优势越发明显.

The model of joint emergency supplies reserves of governments and enterprises based on option procurement

The joint emergency supplies reserves of governments and enterprises can effectively improve the dilemma that supplies are stored too more or too less by governments only. Realizing the joint reserves through market-oriented contracts can overcome the disadvantages of administrative means. Based on these, this paper constructs the model of joint emergency supplies reserves of governments and enterprises based on option procurement. After gaining the optimal decisions of the government and enterprise, the paper gives the condition that the enterprise can participate in the joint reserves and derive the scope of the parameters of option contract that the joint reserves can improve the total reserves of supplies and reduce the level of the government's inventory compared with the model of governments reserving alone under the different situation of spot markets. Meanwhile, the paper also gives the condition that the supply chain can be coordinated and the government and enterprise achieve the win-win situation. Finally, all conclusions above are validated by numerical examples. We further analyze the impact of the uncertainty of the demand of supplies on two reserve models and derive the conclusion that the advantages of joint reserves are more prominent with the uncertainty of the demand of supplies increasing compared with the government reserving alone.