考虑消费者信息获取行为的众筹参数设计

如何通过众筹参数设计(包括众筹目标和众筹价格)向消费者传递产品质量的信号是众筹企业最为关心的问题.本文在考虑消费者具备质量信息获取能力的情况下,通过建立信息不对称条件下的信号博弈模型,刻画了众筹企业通过调整众筹参数设计进行信号传递的存在性条件;并在此基础上,将两种均衡(分离均衡和混同均衡)参数设计下的众筹企业利润进行比较,分析了消费者信息获取行为对均衡结果的影响.研究发现:1)当质量不确定性较低时,高质量众筹企业可以通过增加众筹目标和/或降低众筹价格实现分离均衡,且众筹目标相较于众筹价格而言是更加有效的信号;2)相较于无信息获取的情况,当存在消费者信息获取行为时,高质量众筹企业在混同均衡参数设计下的利润会更高.此外,我们还分析了市场参数对于均衡众筹参数设计的影响以验证结果的鲁棒性.

Designing reward-based crowdfunding campaign under consumer’s information acquisition behavior

Signaling product quality through crowdfunding campaign design parameter(including the funding goal and reward price) to potential consumers is one of the most concerned problems for creators.This paper,by incorporating consumer information acquisition behavior,establishes a signaling game model under asymmetry information situation,and characterizes the existence conditions for the H-type creator to signal his product quality by utilizing the campaign design parameter.Furthermore,on this basis,this paper investigates the equilibrium crowdfunding campaign design strategy by comparing the expected profit under separating and pooling equilibrium,and explores the effect of the existence of consumer information acquisition behavior on the equilibrium outcome.We find that:1) when the quality difference between the two types of crowdfunding products is not very large,the H-type creator can signal his high quality by either increasing his funding target,decreasing the reward price,or both simultaneously.Furthermore,the funding goal is a more effective signal device than the reward price;2) compared with the case where there is no consumer information acquisition behavior,the campaign design parameter under pooling equilibrium is more profitable for the H-type creator when considering this consumer information acquisition behavior.We also explore the effect of some market parameters on the equilibrium crowdfunding campaign design parameter to verify the robustness of our results.