基于数量折扣的时滞变质物品库存协调模型

建立了单个生产商和单个零售商的斯坦伯格博弈模型, 生产商以固定生产率生产一种时滞变质物品, 零售商面对依赖价格和时间的需求. 首先, 分别给出了分散、集中情况下价格和订货批量的均衡解, 并通过数值算例分析得出, 批发价格随着易逝率增加而减小, 随着产品可维持其原有品质的时间的增加而增加; 易逝率较大时, 零售价格随着产品可以维持其原有品质的时间增加而减小; 然而易逝率较小时, 零售价格随着产品可以维持其原有品质的时间增加而增加. 其次, 给出使系统达到最优的数量折扣契约, 通过数值分析得出订货批量增值会随着产品可维持其原有品质时间增加而增加; 价格敏感系数、生产成本增加时, 批发价格折扣的Pareto上下限均会变大. 最后, 通过分析得出, 生产商向零售商提供的最优批发价格折扣随着生产商的生产成本和库存持有成本增加而增加.

Coordination of supply chain with a non-instantaneous deteriorating item based on quantity discount policy

This paper develops a Stackelberg game model of a one-supplier and one-retailer supply chain, where the supplier produces a non-instantaneous deteriorating item with a fixed production rate and the retailer faces a price and time sensitive demand. First, we consider equilibrium outcomes under the decentralized and the centralized settings, respectively. The results show that the unit wholesale price decreases as deteriorating rate increases or the time that product can holds its own character decreases. When deteriorating rate is high, the retail price increases with the time that product holds its own character decreases. While retail price increases with the time that product holds its own character increases, when deteriorating rate is small. Then, we design a quantity discount contact to coordinate the supply chain and show that quantity incremental coefficient increases as the time that product hold its own character increases. Both the ceiling and floor of price discount coefficient increase with the increase of price sensitivity and production cost. At last, the analysis shows that optimal price discount that the supplier offers to the retailer increases as the supplier's holding and manufacturing costs increase.