考虑空间因素的反恐防御竞争分析

恐怖袭击已经成为影响社会公共安全的主要威胁之一.本文针对两个易受恐怖分子攻击的目标间的防御竞争问题进行了模型分析.首次将空间范围因素考虑进来,并基于Hotelling模型求得了最优防御范围.通过建立及对比同时和顺序博弈两种模型发现:同时博弈时会引发防御竞赛,而顺序博弈时会出现搭便车现象.当两目标区域对称时,目标价值越大,达到均衡时受到袭击的概率会越小,与博弈类型无关.相对于扩大防御范围,增加防御密度对反恐更加有效.同时博弈时最优防御范围在中点处,与目标价值大小无关,而顺序博弈时防御范围与目标价值大小有关.研究结果为防御竞争目标间的防御体系构筑提供了决策参考.

Counterterrorism analysis based on Hotelling model

Terrorist attack has been one of the main threats that jeopardize public security. We study the defense competition problem between two vulnerable targets. We take into consideration the spatial factors for the first time and derive the optimal defense scope based on Hotelling model. By exploring both simultaneous game and sequential game respectively, we find the former leads to defense competition while the latter may cause free-ride behavior. When the two targets are symmetric, no matter which game is considered, the more valuable the target is, the less probability the target will be attacked. Compared with enlarging defense scope, increasing defense density is more efficient in improving defense level. The optimal defense scope is independent of the target value in the simultaneous game and depends on the target value in the sequential game. The findings in this paper provide guidance in building up defensive structure for different targets.