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互联网金融涌现的逻辑:投资人的视角
引用本文:王宗润,杨梅,周艳菊.互联网金融涌现的逻辑:投资人的视角[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(11):2791-2801.
作者姓名:王宗润  杨梅  周艳菊
作者单位:中南大学 商学院, 长沙 410083
基金项目:国家自然科学基金重点项目(71631008);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71371194,71471178)
摘    要:信息不对称使得传统金融环境下资源得不到最优配置,致使传统投资机构利润空间逐渐变窄.在互联网金融背景下,对由投资机构直接为中小企业提供融资的传统模式加以改进,引入电商平台,从而考虑一种新的三方参与的间接投融资激励模式.并应用委托代理理论,定量研究传统金融机构、电商平台以及中小企业三者间的投资收益分享契约.进一步通过数值算例分析关键参数对投资收益和投资决策的影响.研究结果表明:相对于传统金融模式,在中小企业经营能力处于较低水平时,电商平台的引入,能够降低中小企业融资门槛,增加授信额度;同时减少中小企业获得的信息租金,提高投资机构的投资效率,从而有效缓解投资机构与中小企业间由于信息不对称所造成的中小企业融资难问题.

关 键 词:互联网金融  电商平台融资  收益分享契约  委托代理理论  Stackleberg博弈  
收稿时间:2015-10-20

Logic of the emergence of Internet finance: Investor's perspective
WANG Zongrun,YANG Mei,ZHOU Yanju.Logic of the emergence of Internet finance: Investor's perspective[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2016,36(11):2791-2801.
Authors:WANG Zongrun  YANG Mei  ZHOU Yanju
Institution:School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
Abstract:Asymmetric information makes the allocation of resources always not the optima in the traditional financial environment, resulting in the traditional investment institutions gradually narrowing their profit margins. Under the background of Internet finance, by introducing e-commerce platforms, we improve the traditional model in which investment institutions provide financing to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) directly, and take into account a new tripartite participate in indirect investment and financing incentive mode. Then, by using principal-agent theory, this paper quantitative study investment revenue-sharing contracts among traditional financial institutions, e-commerce platforms, as well as SMEs. Furthermore, we empirically analyze the impact of the key parameters on the investment income and investment decisions by use of numerical cases. The results show that compared with the traditional financial pattern, when the operation capacity of SMEs is at lower level, the introduction of e-commerce platforms can reduce the threshold for SMEs financing and increase the credit lines; also, the investment efficiency of investment institutions improves while reducing the information rent obtained by SMEs, thereby effectively alleviating the financing difficulty of SMEs which is caused by the information asymmetry between investment institutions and SMEs.
Keywords:Internet finance  e-commerce platform financing  revenue-sharing contract  principal-agent theory  Stackleberg game
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