非对称过度自信水平下的激励机制研究

针对理性的委托人和过度自信的代理人的委托代理关系,研究在考虑道德风险和代理人过度自信水平为其私有信息情况下委托人对代理人的最优激励机制设计问题.结合委托代理理论,为委托人制定契约来激励代理人努力工作并甄别其过度自信水平.进而分析契约并与过度自信水平为双方共同知识的情形比较.结果表明,当委托人不了解代理人的过度自信水平时,委托人期望收益下降,拥有私有信息的代理人的努力程度降低收益却增加.研究结果体现了信息的价值,对如何设计契约并提高激励效率有重要意义.

Research of incentive mechanism based on asymmetry overconfidence level

Aiming at the principal-agent relationship with a rational principal and a overconfidence preference agent, this paper investigates how to design the incentive contract the principal offers to the agent considering moral hazard and private overconfidence level. Incorporating principal-agent theory, we design the incentive contract for the principal to motivate the agent and screen its real overconfidence level. Furthermore, we analyze the corresponding optimal contract and compare the results with the common knowledge scenario. Comparison results show that when the principal is uncertain about the agent's overconfidence level, its expected profit decreases while the agent with private information exerts less effort but obtains higher income, which implies the value of information, the conclusions have an important application value on designing contract and enhancing incentive efficiency.